Reconstructed...June 29th, 2009...
I will aim to make this my most definitive, up-to-date DGB editorial essay on the Freud vs. Masson Seduction Theory Controversy -- complete with all its associated moral-ethical and legal issues -- and how this still debated controversy fits into the overall theory, practice, and evolution of Psychoanalysis, real and/or ideal.
For those of you who know little or nothing about this controversy, let me fill you in very quickly.
In 1896, Freud posed a theory -- albeit very briefly (it lasted less than a year) that hysteria was basically caused by the repression of a childhood sexual assault memory (or series of associated memories) -- either a flat out forceful childhood rape or a more manipulative seduction. The main perpetrators of these crimes against children seemed to be fathers, older brothers, uncles, or 'friends' of the family.
Now looking at this from a 2009 perspective, I would say that there was probably a significant element of truth in what Freud was arguing back in 1896. However, Freud had a strong tendency throughout his career to jump to fast conclusions on the basis of overgeneralizations that were provocative and controversial but tended not to support all of -- but, at best, only part of -- the clinical evidence available to him, and to the rest of the clinical profession and general public regarding the conclusion.
Breuer (Freud's co-writer in 'Studies in Hysteria, 1893, 1895) didn't want to jump to the 'sexual abuse' conclusion -- he was happy with their preceding 'traumacy theory' which on the whole was a better theory than Freud's 1896 Seduction Theory because it 'fit a greater percentage of the clinical population'. Probably all of us because we all have to meet with our 'first rejections and subjective and/or objective traumas' in life at some point in our first 4 or 5 years. At some point in these early years we are all going to face the 'harshness' of life in one way or another -- an abandonment, a betrayal, a discrimination, a tragedy, a failure, a costly mistake, an egotistical or narcissistic blow to our self-esteem -- and one or more of our memories is going to catch this event because it was significant in our evolution -- for better or for worse. But a 'childhood sexual assault' -- that is going to affect a smaller proportion of the general population, not enough of the population to build an entire theory on its premise.
Certainly, Freud was not, and is not, the only person in the world who has ever been guilty of 'jumping to fast conclusions' and 'overgeneralizing'. We all can be deemed guilty of these charges at different time, and in different contexts, in our lives -- some more often and with more drastic consequences than others.
However, when you are the creator of a brand new school of psychology -- a theory of the functioning of the human mind -- it is extremely important that the conclusions and generalizations you come to as a theorist are 'good conclusions' and based on 'good generalizations' relative to the clinical evidence that is available to you.
Otherwise, the whole foundation of the school of psychology you are building is going to creak at its very foundations -- and if the conclusions and/or overgeneralizations that you have made are faulty and bad enough -- your school of psychology is likely going to come tumbling down at some point like a house of cards.
The only thing that is going to delay this structural collapse from happening is perhaps otherwise intelligent people who are 'too loyal to the status quo, too loyal to the assumed and presumed ideas of The Establishment they work for, and who either do not see, do not want to see, are too 'brainwashed' to see, are too scared to challenge, and/or are too happy with their $100,000 plus salary and lifestyle to want to challenge, an assumption and/or a whole set of assumptions that may be simply wrong, and/or -- worse -- pathological. This is where Erich Fromm's concept of 'the pathology of normalcy' (See 'The Sane Society') comes to life, and needs to be fully examined by those theorists who are still idealistically striving for 'the pursuit of truth, fairness, justice and The Enlightenment Way'.
It is easy to lose touch with these values in a sea of cultural and individual, pathological narcissism.
I have another dialectic formula here that is not too profound. Cultural narcissism stimulates and shapes more and more individual narcissism. And individual narcissism, in turn, stimulates and shapes more and more cultural narcissism. The two co-factors -- cultural narcissism and individual narcissism -- are dialectically and often pathologically entwined. Each co-influences the embellishment and exasperation of the other with both individual and cultural narcissism escalating in the process.
However, pathological narcissism -- in and by itself -- is a house of cards that will eventually tumble under its own weight and instability. Worded otherwise, unbridled individual and cultural narcissism will eventually self-destruct in its own toxic poisons.
Historically, we have seen this over and over again -- from Plato's time in Athens to hedonistic fall of Rome.
We have seen this in the 'deconstruction' and decline of the Roman Church once too much narcissistic greed and power had permeated inside leading to one or more various 'regligious Reformations'.
We have seen this in The American Revolution -- too much greed and power coming from the British and 'marginalizing' the Americans.
We have seen this in The French Revolution. Again too much power and greed at the top.
We have seen this in The American Civil War where slaves were being treated as 'non-people.
We have seen this in the collapse -- or at least the 'evening out' of some masculine dominated narcissistic Western and European Societies. Such societies still dominate much of the Middle East.
Now many men on this side of the Atlantic Ocean are wondering whether or not -- if not downright righteously and angrily believing (myself included) that -- the 'pendulum of civil justice has not swung significantly too far the other way incriminating men for domestic violations or sexual assaults where there is more of a need for 'bilateral, two-way, two fault, dialectic justice'
We have seen corporate narcissism just recently bury (or allegedly bury) the American Financial Sector -- and with it the Main Street Housing Market and both collapsed together as well as most of the other financial markets around the world that were connected to these two American markets.
Wherever cultural and individual narcissism proliferates over other more ethical human behavior patterns, generally, there is eventually a collapse. (The only people not collapsing under this this rule of thumb are the ones that are high enough on the corporate ladder that they have found other ways of narcissistically protecting themselves like these 'back door bonus contracts, escape clauses, and severance packages. These corporate executives are like 'pilots who jump from their burning plane with their parachutes on while the rest of the passengers go down in flames.)
Ayn Rand's ethics -- the core of her ethical-morality -- 'The Virtue of Selfishness' is fundamentally flawed to the extent that it denies Kantian 'ethical recipricocity'. Why? Because it promotes individual and cultural narcissism.
'Selfishness' or 'narcissism' in and by itself, is an ethical-moral value that is 'one-sided', it is 'homeostatically out of balance'.
Narcissism absolutely needs its polar, paradoxical, ethical-moral 'alter-ego' in order to be homeostatically balanced properly -- and that alter-ego is 'altruism'.
Similarly, if an organization, an institution, a corporation, a society, a culture --like The Psychoanalytic Institute -- does not contain within it a 'deconstructive element', 'a Deconstructive Ego', then it will 'narcissistically pathologize, toxify, and ultimately self-destruct.
The Deconstructive Ego is the mental, the psychological, the philosophical, the legal, and the political equivalent of 'the liver'. Biologically, the liver removes toxins and pathogens from the body in whatever means it has available to it -- the bowels, the bladder, the immune system, the skin...
The Deconstructive Ego functions in similar fashion on a psychological, philosophical, legal, and political level. It removes pathogens and toxins from the individual's psyche, the organization's psyche, the society's psyche, the culture's psyche.
If there is no Deconstructive Ego, no Deconstructive Element, in a society -- which happens when there is no 'freedom of speech', 'freedom of the press' and 'freedom of philosophical analysis' -- then overwhelmingly narcissistic toxins and pathogens are going to poison the society, the culture, until it self-destructs.
Back to Freud and Psychoanalysis.
Freud was a very active 'Creative-Constructive' theorist. He was also a very active Deconstructionist. Freud was constantly changing and modifying his own theories throughout his own lifetime.
However, Freud was not very good at accepting -- or even properly listening too -- the 'deconstructionist criticisms' of other Psychoanalytic and non-Psychoanalytic theorists. He was too righteous, too narcissistic, too authoritarian, too anal-retentive when it came to listening to other theorists criticize -- and modify -- his own Psychoanalytic theories. How many theorists did he lose -- I can't count them all -- Breuer, Adler, Jung, Reik, Rank, Ferenczi, and that is just off the top of my head; indeed, I could also include the 'post-Freudians', the 'neo-Freudians', and the 'anti-Freudians'...Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Leif Erickson, Harry Stack Sullivan, Berne, Perls, and who knows whether Freud would have ever accepted the 'Object Relationists' and all their various deviations from Classical Freudian Psychoanalysis such as: Melanie Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott, Guntrip, Kohut...and many others...
And last of all their was Jeffrey Masson who turned our attention back to Freud's abandonment of the seduction theory in 1896. Why did Freud abandon a theory that seemed to have at least a significant 'truth element' in it?
Masson's answer to this question was rather harsh and non-forgiving -- coming from his 'Rejecting, Deconstructive Topdog or Underdog' in DGB integrative terminology if you will.
Freud 'lost moral courage' -- according to Masson's interpretation, analysis, and judgment of the situation. (Masson, The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of The Seduction Theory', 1984, 1985, 1992, preface)
Freud 'lost moral courage' because he did not want to jeopardize his career in medicine, psychiatry, and Psychoanalysis. He succumbed to the external social and economic pressures, forces, leverage applied against him by 'non-believing' Psychiatrists who had the political and economic power to make or break Freud's early Psychiatric and Psychoanalytic career. So argues Masson (The Assault, 1992.)
Masson could be at least partly right. It is quite possible that Freud had legitimate reason to fear the 'greater political and economic power' of other, older Psychiatrists and Doctors in his profession who could have potentially ruined his career.
Indeed, it could be easily argued that what could have happened to Freud in 1896 if he had continued to 'open the social can of worms' of childhood sexual abuse is exactly what did happen to Masson in the 1980s some 85 to 90 years later.
Masson's career in Psychoanalysis was destroyed in the 1980s because he ethically persisted in an area where Freud -- for whatever reason -- backed away from, and didn't come back too often to this most controversial of issues, for the remainder of his long career (some 40 years).
Still, I will follow and accept Masson's logical argument about 50 percent of the way -- and no further. Not into the 'loss of moral courage' judgment.
If Freud wanted only to stay clear away from the most controversial issue of childhood sexual abuse, he could have done this much more easily than by 'turning Psychoanalysis upside down to do it'.
Freud didn't need to fully engage in, obsess with, and trumpet his 'new' Psychoanalytic theory of 'Childhood Sexuality, Oedipal and Fantasy Theory' just to escape the 'heat of talking about childhood sexual abuse and its relation to hysteria'.
So why then did Freud turn Psychoanalysis upside down from 'Seduction Theory' to Childhood Sexual Fantasy and Oedipal Theory'?
Freud turned Psychoanalysis upside down between 1896 and let us say 1905 because he thought he was right. Period.
No loss of moral courage. Or maybe some loss of moral courage to the extent that he steered away from the topic of childhood sexual abuse for most of the rest of his career.
However, how many of wouldn't have done the same? Particularly, in that 'highly patriarchal culture'. Knowing that by 'blowing the horn of child sexual abuse' you might be jeopardizing your own career, your own economic stability. It may be a sad statement of human motivation stemming all the way back to the philosophy of 'Sophism' in ancient Greece (who believed basically in the principle of 'subjective ethical relativism' based on 'monetary narcissism'), through Stoicism, Cynicism, Epicureanism, Hobbes, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Marx's 'cynical pessimism' relative to 'Narcissistic Capitalism': 'When money talks, ethics walks.' (my personal philosophical rendition of what Marx believed).
Ethical righteousness supersedes personal narcissism only when the personal narcissism doesn't involve us. (Call this 'the philosophy and psychology of personal and/or group exclusionism and marginalization').
Now, to be sure, this is a generalization as well -- and some might say an overgeneralization. Every generalization carries the seeds of its own self-destruction which is contained in exactly that part of 'life and truth' that lies outside of the boundaries of the generalization. (This is a Hegelian extrapolation.)
Narcissism and ethics are 'dialectic antagonists and war partners' (unless you follow 'The Virtue of Selfishness' Philosophy of Ayn Rand). We all have to walk the plank of personal narcissism vs. personal ethics each and every day. Dionysus and Narcissus vs. Apollo. (Perhaps an unfair fight -- two against one.) We all have to make a 'Kierkegaardian either/or choice' at different points in the day as we walk out onto our existential plank -- the plank and the choices that end up defining us:
Either jump into Dionysus and Narcissus' (non-ethical) pool. Or jump into Apollo's (ethical) pool. Depends partly on our character, partly on the context of the situaiton. Our impulses. Our restraints. Our values. The extent of the social, political and/or economic forces being used against us. And/or on the restraints and forces being used by ourselves, against ourselves.
Apollo, Dionysus, Zeus, Hera, Gaia, Approdite, Aries, Cupid, God, Satan, Jesus...are all mythological-relgious projections and extensions of ourselves and our own inner conflicts between good and evil, narcissism and altruism, narcissism and ethics...patriarchy and matriarchy...love and war, love, lust, and reason...
Back to the issue of 'moral courage'...
How many of us don't choose to 'tell people what they don't want to hear' particularly if that person is our boss who could potentially end our job or career with perhaps just a little too much 'honesty', 'bluntness', 'internal congruence and essence' coming out of our mouth?
How many politicians turn their back on the number of ethical transgressions committed in the process of 'government functioning' (and/or dysfunctioning)?
Would Dr. Masson have shown the same 'moral courage' if he had the opportunity to re-live the 1980s all over again? Would he have re-endured a 10 year lawsuit against Janet Malcolm and The New Yorker -- all over again -- if he had the chance to 're-trumpet his moral righteousness and courage'?
Maybe. Maybe not. I take my hat off to you Dr. Masson. I think that your work has been important -- indeed, imperative -- to the proper evolution of Psychoanalysis and Clinical Psychology/Psychotherapy/Psychiatry in general.
I respect your moral courage.
Which is not to say that I think you are completely right about Freud's motivation -- or the validity of The Seduction Theory in general.
The Seduction Theory is a lopsided, one-sided, overly reductionist theory -- just as The Oedipal Theory is on the other side of The Psychoanalytic fence. It remains for a Post-Hegelian philosopher and psychological theorist like myself to integrate or synthesize the differences between Freud's Traumacy Theory, his Seduction Theory, and his Oedipal Theory -- along with any other theories that may be equally relevant. (Adler, Jung, Reich, Fairbairn, Guntrip, Berne, Kohut, Perls...)
And everything that I have read from other biographers and theorists -- other than from you, Dr. Masson -- have stated that Freud did not lack moral courage, in fact, this was a strength, not a weakness, in his character. There is an Erich Fromm quote in this regard that is particularly relevant. (Sorry, I will have to search for it -- I think I will find it in 'Sigmund Freud's Mission'.
No, Freud may have committed some ethical transgressions in his life, knowingly or unknowingly, such as in his 'trumpeting of cocaine usage and giving it to patients', such as in the Emma Ekstein medical fiasco, such as in perhaps steering away from the controversial issue of childhood sexual abuse. But not to the tune of turning Psychoanalysis on its ear -- and re-theorizing everything.
This he did because he believed what he was doing was right -- even if it was partly or mainly wrong in the extent of his 'theoretical over-compensations'.
Freud was a 'theoretical extremist'. He would either steer 'hard right' and/or overcompensate and then 'steer hard left'.
It remains for other, clearer heads, and more moderate minds, to creatively integrate Freud's left and right, up and down, theoretical extremism.
That is our intent here -- in Hegel's Hotel.
-- dgb, June 29th, 2009.
-- David Gordon Bain,
-- Dialectic Gap-Bridging Negotiations,
-- Are still in process...
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Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Dr. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (born March 28, 1941 as Jeffrey Lloyd Masson in Chicago, Illinois) is an American author, residing in New Zealand. Masson is known for his conclusions about Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis. In his book The Assault on Truth, Masson argued that Freud may have abandoned his seduction theory because he feared that granting the truth of his female patients' claims that they had been sexually abused would hinder the acceptance of his psychoanalytic methods. He has also written about animals and animal rights.
Contents
1 Life and career
2 Views on the Seduction Theory
3 Recent work
4 Personal life
5 Name
6 Writings by Masson
6.1 Reviews of his books
7 References
8 Further reading
9 External links
Life and career
Masson is the son of Jacques Moussaieff, a French Mizrahi Sephardic Jew of Bukharian ancestry, and Diana (Dina) Zeiger from a Ashkenazi strict Orthodox Jewish family. Both parents were followers of the British Jewish mystic Paul Brunton. During the 1940s and 1950s, Brunton often lived with them, eventually designating Jeffrey as his heir apparent. In 1956, Diana and Jacques Masson moved to Uruguay because Brunton believed that a third world war was imminent. Jeffrey and his sister Linda followed in 1959.
At Brunton's urging, Masson went to Harvard University to study Sanskrit. While at Harvard, Masson became disillusioned with Brunton. Brunton and his influence and the Masson family form the subject of Masson's autobiographical book My Father's Guru: A Journey Through Spirituality and Disillusion. Harvard University granted Masson a B.A. in 1964 and a Ph.D. with Honors in 1970. His degrees were in Sanskrit and Indian Studies. While undertaking his Ph.D., Masson also studied, supported by fellowships, at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris, the University of Calcutta, and the University of Poona.
He taught Sanskrit and Indian Studies at the University of Toronto, 1969-80, reaching the rank of Professor. He has also held short term appointments at Brown University, the University of California, and the University of Michigan. From 1981 to 1992, he was a Research Associate, Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies, at the University of California at Berkeley. He is currently an Honorary Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Auckland in New Zealand.
Views on the Seduction Theory
In 1970, Masson began studying to become a psychoanalyst at the Toronto Psychoanalytic Institute, completing a full clinical training course in 1978. During this time, he befriended the psychoanalyst Kurt Eissler and became acquainted with Sigmund Freud's daughter Anna Freud. Eissler designated Masson to succeed him as Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives after his and Anna Freud's death. Masson learned German and studied the history of psychoanalysis. In 1980 Masson was appointed Projects Director of the Freud Archives, with full access to Freud's correspondence and other unpublished papers. While perusing this material, Masson concluded that Freud might have rejected the seduction theory in order to advance the cause of psychoanalysis and to maintain his own place within the psychoanalytic inner circle. [1]
Masson's actions, along with those of Kurt Eissler and Peter Swales, form the subject of In the Freud Archives, an article in the New Yorker by Janet Malcolm, which she later expanded into a book.
In 1981, Masson's controversial conclusions were discussed in a series of New York Times articles by Ralph Blumenthal, to the dismay of the psychoanalytic establishment. Masson was subsequently dismissed from his position as project director of the Freud Archives. and stripped of his membership in psychoanalytic professional societies. Masson was defended by Alice Miller [2] and Muriel Gardiner ("While striving not to take sides," Gardiner said, "I consider him a good and energetic worker and a worthwhile scholar.") [3]
Masson later wrote several books critical of psychoanalysis, including The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory. In the introduction to The Assault on Truth, Masson admitted that, "My pessimistic conclusions may possibly be wrong. The documents may in fact allow a very different reading." [4] Janet Malcolm interviewed Masson at length when writing her long New Yorker article on this controversy. Masson sued the New Yorker for defamation, claiming that Malcolm had misquoted him. The ensuing trial drew considerable attention.[5]The decade-long, $US10 million lawsuit came to a close when the court ruled in the New Yorker 's favor.[6]
In 1985, Masson edited and translated the complete correspondence of Freud with Wilhelm Fliess after having convinced Anna Freud to make all of it available. He also looked up the original places and documents in La Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris,[7] where Freud had studied with Charcot. Masson has written that people used to be very interested in himself but as far as the cause was concerned, there is silence from the scientific community. [8]
[edit] Recent work
Since the early 1990s, Masson has written a number of books on the emotional life of animals, one of which, When Elephants Weep, has been translated into 20 languages. He has explained this radical change in the subject of his writings as follows:
“ "I'd written a whole series of books about psychiatry, and nobody bought them. Nobody liked them. Nobody. Psychiatrists hated them, and they were much too abstruse for the general public. It was very hard to make a living, and I thought, 'As long as I'm not making a living, I may as well write about something I really love: animals.'"[9] ”
Masson also wrote a book about his new home country New Zealand, including an interview with Sir Edmund Hillary. [10] Among other things, Masson and Hillary talk about Alexandra David-Neel and the story of her Tulpa, both of them having read her books Magic and Mystery in Tibet, Initiation and Initiates in Tibet and My Journey to Lhasa. Masson says that he met her in 1957 when he was 16, at her country house at Digne in the south of France.
Personal life
Masson is married to Leila Masson, a pediatrician. [11] They have two sons, Ilan and Manu. He also has a daughter, Simone, by a previous marriage. [12] Masson was once engaged to University of Michigan feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon, who wrote the preface to his A Dark Science: Women, Sexuality, and Psychiatry in the Nineteenth Century.
Name
Jeffrey Masson's grandgrandfather Shlomo Moussaieff (rabbi) was a kabbalist and founder of the Bukharian Quarter in Jerusalem. His grandfather Henry Mousaieff changed his familyname from Moussaieff to Masson. Jeffrey Masson changed his middlename from Lloyd to Moussaieff.
Masson's father's first cousin is Shlomo Moussaieff (businessman). Masson's first cousin is pianist James Raphael and his second cousin is First Lady of Iceland Dorrit Moussaieff.
[edit] Writings by Masson
1974. "India and the Unconscious: Erik Erikson on Gandhi," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 55: 519-26. Discussion by T. C. Sinha: 527.
1976. "Perversions-some observations", Israel Ann. Psychiat. rel. Disc., (1976b), 14, 354-61.
1976. (with Terri C. Masson) "The Navel of Neurosis: Trauma, Memory and Denial.", paper presented to the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society [13]
1978 (with Terri C. Masson), "Buried Memories on the Acropolis. Freud's Relation to Mysticism and Anti-Semitism", International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 59: 199-208.
1980. The Oceanic Feeling: The Origins of Religious Sentiment in Ancient India. (Table of contents)
1981. The Peacock's Egg: Love Poems from Ancient India, W. S. Merwin and J. Moussaieff Masson, eds. ISBN 0-86547-059-6
1984. The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory. Farrar Straus & Giroux. ISBN 0-374-10642-8
1984. "Freud and the Seduction Theory A challenge to the foundations of psychoanalysis," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1984.
1985 (editor). The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904. ISBN 0-674-15420-7
1986. A Dark Science: Women, Sexuality and Psychiatry in the Nineteenth Century. ISBN 0-374-13501-0, last edition 1988
1988. Against Therapy: Emotional Tyranny and the Myth of Psychological Healing. ISBN 0-689-11929-1
1990. Final Analysis: The Making and Unmaking of A Psychoanalyst. Addison-Wesley. ISBN 0-201-52368-X, new edition 2003
1993. My Father's Guru: A Journey Through Spirituality and Disillusion, Addison-Wesley. ISBN 0-201-56778-4
Dogs Never Lie About Love: Reflections on the Emotional World of Dogs.
1995. When Elephants Weep: The Emotional Life of Animals.
The Pig Who Sang to the Moon: The Emotional World of Farm Animals.
The Nine Emotional Lives of Cats: A Journey Into the Feline Heart. ISBN 0345448820
The Cat Who Came in from the Cold. Wheeler. ISBN 1587249146
The Emperors Embrace Reflections on Animal Families and Fatherhood.
The Evolution of Fatherhood: A Celebration of Animal and Human Families.
Raising the Peaceable Kingdom: What Animals Can Teach Us about the Social Origins of Tolerance and Friendship.
Lost Prince : The Unsolved Mystery of Kaspar Hauser. [14]
Sex and Yoga: Psychoanalysis and the Indian Religious Experience in Vishnu on Freud's Desk: A Reader in Psychoanalysis and Hinduism, T.G. Vaidyanathan & Jeffrey J. Kripal (editors): , Oxford University Press, ISBN 0195658353, Paperback (Edition: 2003)[15]
Slipping into Paradise: Why I live in New Zealand. ISBN 0-345-46634-9
2006. Altruistic Armadillos - Zen-Like Zebras: A Menagerie of 100 Favorite Animals. ISBN 978-0-345-47881-8 (0-345-47881-9)
See Masson's praise of the book by Luna Tarlo, the mother of Andrew Cohen.
1995, "A Note on U.G. Krishnamurti."
[edit] Reviews of his books
The Original Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904: By William McGrath.
Against Therapy:
By Jeanne Stubbs.
By Wray Herbert.
Final Analysis: By Michael Sacks.
Breaking Away From the Cult: By Carol Tavris.
[edit] References
^ "Did Freud's Isolation Lead Him to Reverse Theory on Neurosis?" by Ralph Blumenthal, New York Times, August 25, 1981
^ PSYCHOLOGIE HEUTE, April 1987, P.21, 22: "Im Gegensatz zu manchen Interpreten, die, wie zum Beispiel Marianne Krüll, Marie Balmary oder Jeffrey Masson, Freuds Abkehr von der Wahrheit als Folge seiner Familiengeschichte deuten, sehe ich diesen Schritt als Folge und Ausdruck unserer jahrtausendealten kinderfeindlichen Tradition, in der wir auch heute noch leben. Die Ergebnisse der oben genannten historischen Forscher können trotzdem korrekt sein, aber ich meine, daß es Freud trotz der persönlichen Familiengeschichte möglich gewesen wäre, seiner Entdeckung treu zu bleiben, wenn die Gesellschaft als Ganzes nicht so kinderfeindlich gewesen wäre, wenn schon damals andere, freiere Erziehungsmuster denkbar gewesen wären. Doch zur Zeit Freuds war es noch absolut unmöglich, die Unschuld der Eltern in Frage zu stellen." Alice Miller in interview entitled Wie Psychotherapien das Kind verraten
^ "Freud Archives Research Chief Removed in Dispute Over Yale Talk" by Ralph Blumenthal, New York Times November 9, 1981.
^ Masson, Jeffrey (1992). The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory. New York: Harper Perennial. xxxv. ISBN 0-06-097457-5.
^ David Margolick (1994-11-03). "Psychoanalyst Loses Libel Suit Against a New Yorker Reporter". The New York Times.
^ SMH article October 6, 2007
^ History of La Salpêtrière
^ Masson, J., 1990. Final Analysis: The Making and Unmaking of a Psychoanalyst. Addison-Wesley. ISBN 0-201-52368-X.
^ Powells.com Interviews - Jeffrey Masson
^ Masson, J., "A Conversation with a Great Ordinary Kiwi: Sir Edmund Hillary," chpt. 7 in Slipping into Paradise.
^ [1]
^ [2]
^ [3]
^ Review
^ Table of Contents
[edit] Further reading
Kurt R. Eissler, 2001. Freud and the seduction theory: A brief love affair, New York: International Universities Press.
Janet Malcolm, 2002. In the Freud Archives, New York Review of Books. ISBN 159017027X
Sthitaprajna (Perfect Yogi) - Part 2
Luna Tarlo, 1997. The Mother of God. Plover Press. ISBN 9781570270437
[edit] External links
From Jeffrey Masson's Website
Masson's website.
About Jeff (with new Photo of Jeffrey and his family)
Photo
Articles
"Scholars seek the hidden Freud in newly emerging letters." The first of two NYT articles by Ralph Blumenthal, published August 18, 1981.
"Till Press Do Us Part: The Trial of Janet Malcolm and Jeffrey Masson."
Interviews
Transcript of an interview: Jeffrey Masson talking with Kirsten Garrett about Sigmund Freud and Emma Eckstein/ first broadcast on The Science Show in 1986, second broadcast 3 June 2006 presented by Robyn Williams
[4] A conversation about the lives of animals with Susan McCarthy and Jeffrey Moussaieff Mason on Jun 30, 1995, Duration 60 min (Audio)
"Walking on the Beach with Jeffrey Masson's Cats," November 14, 2002
"Conversation between Masson and Richard Fidler. Related Audio, December 14, 2007.
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey_Moussaieff_Masson"
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Janet Malcolm
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Janet Malcolm (born 1934) is an American writer and journalist on staff at The New Yorker magazine. She is the author of The Journalist and the Murderer, Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession, and In the Freud Archives.
Malcolm is best known for the 1991 lawsuit triggered by In the Freud Archives, when psychoanalyst Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson sued Malcolm and The New Yorker for $10 million, after claiming that Malcolm had fabricated explosive quotations attributed to him. After several years of proceedings, the court found against Masson.
Craig Seligman wrote of her: "Like Sylvia Plath, whose not-niceness she has laid open with surgical skill, she discovered her vocation in not-niceness ... Malcolm's blade gleams with a razor edge. Her critics tend to go after her with broken bottles."[1] The influential critic Harold Bloom has praised her "wonderful exuberance," writing that Malcolm's books, "transcend what they appear to be: superb reportage."[2]
Contents
[hide]
* 1 Background and personal
* 2 Masson case
* 3 The Journalist and the Murderer
* 4 Works
* 5 References
* 6 Sources
* 7 External links
[edit] Background and personal
Malcolm was born in Prague in 1934, one of two daughters--the other is author Marie Winn-- of a psychiatrist father. She has resided in the United States since her family emigrated from Czechoslovakia in 1939. Malcolm was educated at the University of Michigan and lives in New York City. Her first husband, Donald Malcolm, reviewed books for The New Yorker in the 1950s and 1960's. Her second husband, whom she wed in 1975, was long-time New Yorker editor Gardner Botsford; Botsford died at age 87 in September, 2004.
Early Malcolm book jackets report her "living in New York with her husband and daughter." Her daughter is also mentioned in the text of The Crime of Sheila McGough.
[edit] Masson case
Publication of the book In The Freud Archives triggered a $10 million legal challenge by Jeffrey Masson, former project director for the Freud Archives, who claimed that Malcolm had libelled him by fabricating quotations attributed to him; these quotes, Masson contended, had brought him into disrepute.
In the disputed quotations, Masson called himself an "intellectual gigolo", who had slept with over 1000 women; said he wanted to turn the Freud estate into a haven of "sex, women and fun"; and claimed that he was, "after Freud, the greatest analyst that ever lived." Malcolm was unable to produce all the disputed material on tape. The case was partially adjudicated before the Supreme Court[3], and after years of proceedings, a jury finally found against Masson in 1994. (See the opinion at Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (89-1799), 501 U.S. 496 (1991))
In August, 1995, Malcolm discovered a misplaced notebook containing three of the disputed quotes. As reported in The New York Times[4] the author "declared in an affidavit under penalty of perjury that the notes were genuine."
[edit] The Journalist and the Murderer
The thesis of The Journalist and the Murderer is contained in its first sentence: "Every journalist who is not too stupid or too full of himself to notice what is going on knows that what he does is morally indefensible."[5]
Malcolm's example was popular non-fiction writer Joe McGinniss, author of The Selling of the President, among others; while researching his non-fiction, true crime book Fatal Vision, McGinniss lived with the defense team of former Green Beret doctor Jeffrey MacDonald, then on trial for the 1970 murders of his pregnant wife and two daughters. In the published Fatal Vision, McGinniss concluded that MacDonald was a sociopath and had been unbalanced by amphetamines when he slew his family. McGinniss drew upon the work of social critic Christopher Lasch to construct a portrait of MacDonald as a "pathological narcissist".[6]
Malcolm contended that McGinniss was pressed into this strategy for professional and structural reasons — by MacDonald's "lack of vividness"[7] as a real-life character who would be carrying the book. "As every journalist will confirm," Malcolm writes[8],
"MacDonald's uninterestingness is not unusual at all...When a journalist fetches up against someone like [him], all he can do is flee and hope that a more suitable subject will turn up soon. In the MacDonald-McGinniss case we have an instance of a journalist who apparently found out too late that the subject of his book was not up to scratch — not a member of the wonderful race of auto-fictionalizers, like Joseph Mitchell's Joe Gould and Truman Capote's Perry Smith, on whom the "non-fiction novel" depends for its life...The solution that McGinniss arrived at for dealing with MacDonald's characterlessness was not a satisfactory one, but it had to do."
Per Malcolm, it was to conceal this deficit that McGinniss quoted liberally from Lasch's 1979 study The Culture of Narcissism. This, to her, was a professional sin. McGinniss' moral sin, his "indefensible" act in her view, was to pretend to a belief in MacDonald's innocence, long after he'd become convinced of the man's guilt.
The book created a sensation when in March 1989 it appeared in two parts in The New Yorker magazine.[9] Roundly criticized upon first publication[10], the book is still controversial, though some have since become regarded as a classic[11], and ranks ninety-seventh in The Modern Library's list of the twentieth century's "100 Best Works of Nonfiction".[12] As Douglas McCollum wrote in the Columbia Journalism Review, "In the decade after Malcolm's essay appeared, her once controversial theory became received wisdom."
[edit] Works
* Diana & Nikon: Essays on the Aesthetic of Photography (1980)
* Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession (1981)
* In The Freud Archives (1984)
* The Journalist and The Murderer (1990)
* The Purloined Clinic: Selected Writings (1992), which contains the essays "A Girl of the Zeitgeist" and "The Window Washer"
* The Silent Woman: Sylvia Plath & Ted Hughes (1994)
* The Crime of Sheila McGough (1999)
* Reading Chekhov: A Critical Journey (2001)
* Two Lives: Gertrude and Alice (2007)
[edit] References
1. ^ Seligman, Craig. Salon, "Brilliant Careers: Janet Malcolm". February 2, 2000.
2. ^ Bloom, Harold, The New York Times Book Review, "War Within The Walls", May 27, 1984.
3. ^ / Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991)
4. ^ Stout, David, The New York Times, "Malcolm's Notes and a Child at Play", August 30, 1995
5. ^ Malcolm, Janet, The Journalist and the Murderer, New York: Knopf, 1990.
6. ^ Malcolm, The Journalist and the Murderer, pps. 28, 72-3.
7. ^ Malcolm, p.68
8. ^ Malcolm, pps. 71-3.
9. ^ Scardino, Albert, The New York Times. "Ethic, Reporters and The New Yorker", March 21. 1989. "Janet Malcolm, a staff writer for The New Yorker, returned her magazine to the center of the long-running debate over ethics in journalism this month...Her declarations provoked outrage among authors, reporters and editors, who rushed last week to distinguish themselves from the journalists Miss Malcolm was describing."
10. ^ See Friendly, Fred W., The New York Times Book Review, "Was Trust Betrayed?", February 25, 1990, and Lehmann-Haupt, Christopher, The New York Times, "Deception and Journalism: How Far to Go for the Story", February 22, 1990.
11. ^ McCollum, Douglas, Columbia Journalism Review, "You Have The Right to Remain Silent", January, February, 2003.
12. ^ The Modern Library 100 Best
Sources
* Janet Malcolm by Craig Seligman, Salon.com, February 29, 2000
External links
* NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH?
* The Lives They Lived: Kurt Eissler, b. 1908; Keeper of Freud's Secrets, By JANET MALCOLM, Published: January 2, 2000
* Malcolm archive from The New York Review of Books
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janet_Malcolm"
Categories: 1934 births | Living people | American journalists | Czech expatriates | Members of The American Academy of Arts and Letters | People from Prague | New Yorker staff writers | University of Michigan alumni
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Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (89-1799), 501 U.S. 496 (1991)
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MASSON v. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, INC.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
No. 89-1799
M. MASSON, PETITIONER v. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, INC., ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC. and JANET MALCOLM
[June 20, 1991]
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this libel case, a public figure claims he was defamed by an author who, with full knowledge of the inaccuracy, used quotation marks to attribute to him comments he had not made. The First Amendment protects authors and journalists who write about public figures by requiring a plaintiff to prove that the defamatory statements were made with what we have called "actual malice," a term of art denoting deliberate or reckless falsification. We consider in this opinion whether the attributed quotations had the degree of falsity required to prove this state of mind, so that the public figure can defeat a motion for summary judgment and proceed to a trial on the merits of the defamation claim.
I
Petitioner Jeffrey Masson trained at Harvard University as a Sanskrit scholar, and in 1970 became a professor of Sanskrit & Indian Studies at the University of Toronto. He spent eight years in psychoanalytic training, and qualified as an analyst in 1978. Through his professional activities, he came to know Dr. Kurt Eissler, head of the Sigmund Freud Archives, and Dr. Anna Freud, daughter of Sigmund Freud and a major psychoanalyst in her own right. The Sigmund Freud Archives, located at Maresfield Gardens outside of London, serves as a repository for materials about Freud, including his own writings, letters, and personal library. The materials, and the right of access to them, are of immense value to those who study Freud, his theories, life and work.
In 1980, Eissler and Anna Freud hired petitioner as Projects Director of the Archives. After assuming his post, petitioner became disillusioned with Freudian psychology. In a 1981 lecture before the Western New England Psychoanalytical Society in New Haven, Connecticut, he advanced his theories of Freud. Soon after, the Board of the Archives terminated petitioner as Projects Director.
Respondent Janet Malcolm is an author and a contributor to respondent The New Yorker, a weekly magazine. She contacted petitioner in 1982 regarding the possibility of an article on his relationship with the Archives. He agreed, and the two met in person and spoke by telephone in a series of interviews. Based on the interviews and other sources, Malcolm wrote a lengthy article. One of Malcolm's narrative devices consists of enclosing lengthy passages in quotation marks, reporting statements of Masson, Eissler, and her other subjects.
During the editorial process, Nancy Franklin, a member of the fact-checking department at The New Yorker, called petitioner to confirm some of the facts underlying the article. According to petitioner, he expressed alarm at the number of errors in the few passages Franklin discussed with him. Petitioner contends that he asked permission to review those portions of the article which attributed quotations or information to him, but was brushed off with a never-fulfilled promise to "get back to [him]." App. 67. Franklin disputes petitioner's version of their conversation. App. 246-247.
The New Yorker published Malcolm's piece in December 1983, as a two-part series. In 1984, with knowledge of at least petitioner's general allegation that the article contained defamatory material, respondent Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., published the entire work as a book, entitled In the Freud Archives.
Malcolm's work received complimentary reviews. But this gave little joy to Masson, for the book portrays him in a most unflattering light. According to one reviewer,
"Masson the promising psychoanalytic scholar emerges gradually, as a grandiose egotist — mean-spirited, self-serving, full of braggadocio, impossibly arrogant and, in the end, a self-destructive fool. But it is not Janet Malcolm who calls him such: his own words reveal this psychological profile — a self-portrait offered to us through the efforts of an observer and listener who is, surely, as wise as any in the psychoanalytic profession." Coles, Freudianism Confronts Its Malcontents, Boston Globe, May 27, 1984, pp. 58, 60.
Petitioner wrote a letter to the New York Times Book Review calling the book "distorted." In response, Malcolm stated:
"Many of [the] things Mr. Masson told me (on tape) were discreditable to him, and I felt it best not to include them. Everything I do quote Mr. Masson as saying was said by him, almost word for word. (The `almost' refers to changes made for the sake of correct syntax.) I would be glad to play the tapes of my conversation with Mr. Masson to the editors of The Book Review whenever they have 40 or 50 short hours to spare." App. 222-223.
Petitioner brought an action for libel under California law in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. During extensive discovery and repeated amendments to the complaint, petitioner concentrated on various passages alleged to be defamatory, dropping some and adding others. The tape recordings of the interviews demonstrated that petitioner had, in fact, made statements substantially identical to a number of the passages, and those passages are no longer in the case. We discuss only the passages relied on by petitioner in his briefs to this Court.
Each passage before us purports to quote a statement made by petitioner during the interviews. Yet in each instance no identical statement appears in the more than 40 hours of taped interviews. Petitioner complains that Malcolm fabricated all but one passage; with respect to that passage, he claims Malcolm omitted a crucial portion, rendering the remainder misleading.
(a) "Intellectual Gigolo." Malcolm quoted a description by petitioner of his relationship with Eissler and Anna Freud as follows:
" `Then I met a rather attractive older graduate student and I had an affair with her. One day, she took me to some art event, and she was sorry afterward. She said, "Well, it is very nice sleeping with you in your room, but you're the kind of person who should never leave the room — you're just a social embarrassment anywhere else, though you do fine in your own room." And you know, in their way, if not in so many words, Eissler and Anna Freud told me the same thing. They like me well enough "in my own room." They loved to hear from me what creeps and dolts analysts are. I was like an intellectual gigolo — you get your pleasure from him, but you don't take him out in public. . . .' " In the Freud Archives 38.
The tape recordings contain the substance of petitioner's reference to his graduate student friend, App. 95, but no suggestion that Eissler or Anna Freud considered him, or that he considered himself, an " `intellectual gigolo.' " Instead, petitioner said:
"They felt, in a sense, I was a private asset but a public liability. . . . They liked me when I was alone in their living room, and I could talk and chat and tell them the truth about things and they would tell me. But that I was, in a sense, much too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for these important training analysts to be caught dead with me." Id., at 104.
(b) "Sex, Women, Fun." Malcolm quoted petitioner as describing his plans for Maresfield Gardens, which he had hoped to occupy after Anna Freud's death:
" `It was a beautiful house, but it was dark and sombre and dead. Nothing ever went on there. I was the only person who ever came. I would have renovated it, opened it up, brought it to life. Maresfield Gardens would have been a center of scholarship, but it would also have been a place of sex, women, fun. It would have been like the change in The Wizard of Oz, from black-and-white into color.' " In the Freud Archives 33.
The tape recordings contain a similar statement, but in place of the reference to "sex, women, fun," and The Wizard of Oz, petitioner commented:
"[I]t is an incredible storehouse. I mean, the library, Freud's library alone is priceless in terms of what it contains: all his books with his annotations in them; the Schreber case annotated, that kind of thing. It's fascinating." App. 127.
Petitioner did talk, earlier in the interview, of his meeting with a London analyst:
"I like him. So, and we got on very well. That was the first time we ever met and you know, it was buddybuddy, and we were to stay with each other and [laughs] we were going to pass women on to each other, and we were going to have a great time together when I lived in the Freud house. We'd have great parties there and we were [laughs] —
. . . . .
". . . going to really, we were going to live it up." Id., at 129.
(c) "It Sounded Better." Petitioner spoke with Malcolm about the history of his family, including the reasons his grandfather changed the family name from Moussaieff to Masson, and why petitioner adopted the abandoned family name as his middle name. The article contains the passage:
" `My father is a gem merchant who doesn't like to stay in any one place too long. His father was a gem merchant, too — a Bessarabian gem merchant, named Moussaieff, who went to Paris in the twenties and adopted the name Masson. My parents named me Jeffrey Lloyd Masson, but in 1975 I decided to change my middle name to Moussaieff — it sounded better.' " In the Freud Archives 36.
In the most similar tape recorded statement, Masson explained at considerable length that his grandfather had changed the family name from Moussaieff to Masson when living in France, "[j]ust to hide his Jewishness." Petitioner had changed his last name back to Moussaieff, but his thenwife Terry objected that "nobody could pronounce it and nobody knew how to spell it, and it wasn't the name that she knew me by." Petitioner had changed his name to Mous saieff because he "just liked it." "[I]t was sort of part of analysis: a return to the roots, and your family tradition and so on." In the end, he had agreed with Terry that "it wasn't her name after all," and used Moussaieff as a middle instead of a last name. App. 87-89.
(d) "I Don't Know Why I Put It In." The article recounts part of a conversation between Malcolm and petitioner about the paper petitioner presented at his 1981 New Haven lecture:
"[I] asked him what had happened between the time of the lecture and the present to change him from a Freudian psychoanalyst with somewhat outre views into the bitter and belligerent anti-Freudian he had become.
"Masson sidestepped my question. `You're right, there was nothing disrespectful of analysis in that paper,' he said. `That remark about the sterility of psychoanalysis was something I tacked on at the last minute, and it was totally gratuitous. I don't know why I put it in.' " In the Freud Archives 53.
The tape recordings instead contain the following discussion of the New Haven lecture:
Masson: "So they really couldn't judge the material. And, in fact, until the last sentence I think they were quite fascinated. I think the last sentence was an in, [sic] possibly, gratuitously offensive way to end a paper to a group of analysts. Uh, — "
Malcolm: "What were the circumstances under which you put it [in]? . . ."
Masson: "That it was, was true.
. . . . .
". . . I really believe it. I didn't believe anybody would agree with me.
. . . . .
". . . But I felt I should say something because the paper's still well within the analytic tradition in a sense. . . .
. . . . .
". . . It's really not a deep criticism of Freud. It contains all the material that would allow one to criticize Freud but I didn't really do it. And then I thought, I really must say one thing that I really believe, that's not going to appeal to anybody and that was the very last sentence. Because I really do believe psychoanalysis is entirely sterile . . . ." App. 176.
(e) "Greatest Analyst Who Ever Lived." The article contains the following self-explanatory passage:
"A few days after my return to New York, Masson, in a state of elation, telephoned me to say that Farrar, Straus & Giroux has taken The Assault on Truth [Masson's book]. `Wait till it reaches the best-seller list, and watch how the analysts will crawl,' he crowed. `They move whichever way the wind blows. They will want me back, they will say that Masson is a great scholar, a major analyst — after Freud, he's the greatest analyst who ever lived. Suddenly they'll be calling, begging, cajoling: "Please take back what you've said about our profession; our patients are quitting." They'll try a short smear campaign, then they'll try to buy me, and ultimately they'll have to shut up. Judgment will be passed by history. There is no possible refutation of this book. It's going to cause a revolution in psychoanalysis. Analysis stands or falls with me now.' " In the Freud Archives 162.
This material does not appear in the tape recordings. Petitioner did make the following statements on related topics in one of the taped interviews with Malcolm:
". . . I assure you when that book comes out, which I honestly believe is an honest book, there is nothing, you know, mean-minded about it. It's the honest fruit of research and intellectual toil. And there is not an analyst in the country who will say a single word in favor of it." App. 136.
"Talk to enough analysts and get them right down to these concrete issues and you watch how different it is from my position. It's utterly the opposite and that's finally what I realized, that I hold a position that no other analyst holds, including, alas, Freud. At first I thought: Okay, it's me and Freud against the rest of the analytic world, or me and Freud and Anna Freud and Kur[t] Eissler and Vic Calef and Brian Bird and Sam Lipton against the rest of the world. Not so, it's me. it's me alone." Id., at 139.
The tape of this interview also contains the following exchange between petitioner and Malcolm:
Masson: ". . . analysis stands or falls with me now."
Malcolm: "Well that's a very grandiose thing to say."
Masson: "Yeah, but it's got nothing to do with me. It's got to do with the things I discovered." Id., at 137.
(f) "He Had The Wrong Man." In discussing the Archives' board meeting at which petitioner's employment was terminated, Malcolm quotes petitioner as giving the following explanation of Eissler's attempt to extract a promise of confidentiality:
" `[Eissler] was always putting moral pressure on me. "Do you want to poison Anna Freud's last days? Have you no heart? You're going to kill the poor old woman." I said to him, "What have I done? You're doing it. You're firing me. What am I supposed to do — be grateful to you?" "You could be silent about it. You could swallow it. I know it is painful for you. But you could just live with it in silence." "Why should I do that?" "Because it is the honorable thing to do." Well, he had the wrong man.' " In the Freud Archives 67.
From the tape recordings, on the other hand, it appears that Malcolm deleted part of petitioner's explanation (italicized below), and petitioner argues that the "wrong man" sentence relates to something quite different from Eissler's entreaty that silence was "the honorable thing." In the tape recording, petitioner states:
"But it was wrong of Eissler to do that, you know. He was constantly putting various kinds of moral pressure on me and, `Do you want to poison Anna Freud's last days? Have you no heart?' He called me: `Have you no heart? You're going to kill the poor old woman. Have you no heart? Think of what she's done for you and you are now willing to do this to her.' I said, `What have I, what have I done? You did it. You fired me. What am I supposed to do: thank you? be grateful to you?' He said, `Well you could never talk about it. You could be silent about it. You could swallow it. I know it's painful for you but just live with it in silence.' `Fuck you,' I said, `Why should I do that? Why? You know, why should one do that?' `Because it's the honorable thing to do and you will save face. And who knows? If you never speak about it and you quietly and humbly accept our judgment, who knows that in a few years if we don't bring you back?' Well, he had the wrong man." App. 215-216.
Malcolm submitted to the District Court that not all of her discussions with petitioner were recorded on tape, in particular conversations that occurred while the two of them walked together or traveled by car, while petitioner stayed at Malcolm's home in New York, or while her tape recorder was inoperable. She claimed to have taken notes of these unrecorded sessions, which she later typed, then discarding the handwritten originals. Petitioner denied that any discussion relating to the substance of the article occurred during his stay at Malcolm's home in New York, that Malcolm took notes during any of their conversations, or that Malcolm gave any indication that her tape recorder was broken.
Respondents moved for summary judgment. The parties agreed that petitioner was a public figure and so could escape summary judgment only if the evidence in the record would permit a reasonable finder of fact, by clear and convincing evidence, to conclude that respondents published a defamatory statement with actual malice as defined by our cases. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-256 (1986). The District Court analyzed each of the passages and held that the alleged inaccuracies did not raise a jury question. The court found that the allegedly fabricated quotations were either substantially true, or were " `one of a number of possible rational interpretations' of a conversation or event that `bristled with ambiguities,' " and thus were entitled to constitutional protection. 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (1987) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512 (1984)). The court also ruled that the "he had the wrong man" passage involved an exercise of editorial judgment upon which the courts could not intrude. 686 F. Supp., at 1403-1404.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting. 895 F. 2d 1535 (CA9 1989). The court assumed for much of its opinion that Malcolm had deliberately altered each quotation not found on the tape recordings, but nevertheless held that petitioner failed to raise a jury question of actual malice, in large part for the reasons stated by the District Court. In its examination of the "intellectual gigolo" passage, the court agreed with the District Court that petitioner could not demonstrate actual malice because Malcolm had not altered the substantive content of petitioner's self-description, but went on to note that it did not consider the "intellectual gigolo" passage defamatory, as the quotation merely reported Kurt Eissler's and Anna Freud's opinions about petitioner. In any event, concluded the court, the statement would not be actionable under the " `incremental harm branch' of the `libelproof' doctrine," id., at 1541 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 781 F. 2d 298, 310-311 (CA2 1986)).
The dissent argued that any intentional or reckless alteration would prove actual malice, so long as a passage within quotation marks purports to be a verbatim rendition of what was said, contains material inaccuracies, and is defamatory. 895 F. 2d, at 1562-1570. We granted certiorari, 498 U. S. — (1990), and now reverse.
II
A
Under California law, "[l]ibel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing . . . which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. 45 (West 1982). False attribution of statements to a person may constitute libel, if the falsity exposes that person to an injury comprehended by the statute. See Selleck v. Globe International, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 1132, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 844 (1985); Cameron v. Wernick, 251 Cal. App. 2d 890, 60 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1967); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 213, 127 P. 2d 577, 581 (1942); cf. Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 260-261, 721 P. 2d 87, 90-91 (1986). It matters not under California law that petitioner alleges only part of the work at issue to be false. "[T]he test of libel is not quantitative; a single sentence may be the basis for an action in libel even though buried in a much longer text," though the California courts recognize that "[w]hile a drop of poison may be lethal, weaker poisons are sometimes diluted to the point of impotency." Washburn v. Wright, 261 Cal. App. 2d 789, 795, 68 Cal. Rptr. 224, 228 (1968).
The First Amendment limits California's libel law in various respects. When, as here, the plaintiff is a public figure, he cannot recover unless he proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the defamatory statement with actual malice, i. e., with "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964). Mere negligence does not suffice. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the author "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication," St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968), or acted with a "high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
Actual malice under the New York Times standard should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will. See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). We have used the term actual malice as a shorthand to describe the First Amendment protections for speech injurious to reputation and we continue to do so here. But the term can confuse as well as enlighten. In this respect, the phrase may be an unfortunate one. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666, n. 7 (1989). In place of the term actual malice, it is better practice that jury instructions refer to publication of a statement with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or falsity. This definitional principle must be remembered in the case before us.
B
In general, quotation marks around a passage indicate to the reader that the passage reproduces the speaker's words verbatim. They inform the reader that he or she is reading the statement of the speaker, not a paraphrase or other indirect interpretation by an author. By providing this information, quotations add authority to the statement and credibility to the author's work. Quotations allow the reader to form his or her own conclusions, and to assess the conclusions of the author, instead of relying entirely upon the author's characterization of her subject.
A fabricated quotation may injure reputation in at least two senses, either giving rise to a conceivable claim of defamation. First, the quotation might injure because it attributes an untrue factual assertion to the speaker. An example would be a fabricated quotation of a public official admitting he had been convicted of a serious crime when in fact he had not.
Second, regardless of the truth or falsity of the factual matters asserted within the quoted statement, the attribution may result in injury to reputation because the manner of expression or even the fact that the statement was made indicates a negative personal trait or an attitude the speaker does not hold. John Lennon once was quoted as saying of the Beatles, "We're more popular than Jesus Christ now." Time, Aug. 12, 1966, p. 38. Supposing the quotation had been a fabrication, it appears California law could permit recovery for defamation because, even without regard to the truth of the underlying assertion, false attribution of the statement could have injured his reputation. Here, in like manner, one need not determine whether petitioner is or is not the greatest analyst who ever lived in order to determine that it might have injured his reputation to be reported as having so proclaimed.
A self-condemnatory quotation may carry more force than criticism by another. It is against self-interest to admit one's own criminal liability, arrogance, or lack of integrity, and so all the more easy to credit when it happens. This principle underlies the elemental rule of evidence which permits the introduction of admissions, despite their hearsay character, because we assume "that persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(3), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 789 (citing Hileman v. Northwest Engineering Co., 346 F. 2d 668 (CA6 1965)).
Of course, quotations do not always convey that the speaker actually said or wrote the quoted material. "Punctuation marks, like words, have many uses. Writers often use quotation marks, yet no reasonable reader would assume that such punctuation automatically implies the truth of the quoted material." Baker v. Los Angeles Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d, at 263, 721 P. 2d, at 92. In Baker, a television reviewer printed a hypothetical conversation between a station vice president and writer/producer, and the court found that no reasonable reader would conclude the plaintiff in fact had made the statement attributed to him. Id., at 267, 721 P. 2d, at 95. Writers often use quotations as in Baker, and a reader will not reasonably understand the quotations to indicate reproduction of a conversation that took place. In other instances, an acknowledgement that the work is so-called docudrama or historical fiction, or that it recreates conversations from memory, not from recordings, might indicate that the quotations should not be interpreted as the actual statements of the speaker to whom they are attributed.
The work at issue here, however, as with much journalistic writing, provides the reader no clue that the quotations are being used as a rhetorical device or to paraphrase the speaker's actual statements. To the contrary, the work purports to be nonfiction, the result of numerous interviews. At least a trier of fact could so conclude. The work contains lengthy quotations attributed to petitioner, and neither Malcolm nor her publishers indicate to the reader that the quotations are anything but the reproduction of actual conversations. Further, the work was published in The New Yorker, a magazine which at the relevant time seemed to enjoy a reputation for scrupulous factual accuracy. These factors would, or at least could, lead a reader to take the quotations at face value. A defendant may be able to argue to the jury that quotations should be viewed by the reader as nonliteral or reconstructions, but we conclude that a trier of fact in this case could find that the reasonable reader would understand the quotations to be nearly verbatim reports of statements made by the subject.
C
The constitutional question we must consider here is whether, in the framework of a summary judgment motion, the evidence suffices to show that respondents acted with the requisite knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or falsity. This inquiry in turn requires us to consider the concept of falsity; for we cannot discuss the standards for knowledge or reckless disregard without some understanding of the acts required for liability. We must consider whether the requisite falsity inheres in the attribution of words to the petitioner which he did not speak.
In some sense, any alteration of a verbatim quotation is false. But writers and reporters by necessity alter what people say, at the very least to eliminate grammatical and syntactical infelicities. If every alteration constituted the falsity required to prove actual malice, the practice of journalism, which the First Amendment standard is designed to protect, would require a radical change, one inconsistent with our precedents and First Amendment principles. Petitioner concedes this absolute definition of falsity in the quotation context is too stringent, and acknowledges that "minor changes to correct for grammar or syntax" do not amount to falsity for purposes of proving actual malice. Brief for Petitioner 18, 36-37. We agree, and must determine what, in addition to this technical falsity, proves falsity for purposes of the actual malice inquiry.
Petitioner argues that, excepting correction of grammar or syntax, publication of a quotation with knowledge that it does not contain the words the public figure used demonstrates actual malice. The author will have published the quotation with knowledge of falsity, and no more need be shown. Petitioner suggests that by invoking more forgiving standards the Court of Appeals would permit and encourage the publication of falsehoods. Petitioner believes that the intentional manufacture of quotations does not "represen[t] the sort of inaccuracy that is commonplace in the forum of robust debate to which the New York Times rule applies," Bose Corp., 466 U. S., at 513, and that protection of deliberate falsehoods would hinder the First Amendment values of robust and well-informed public debate by reducing the reliability of information available to the public.
We reject the idea that any alteration beyond correction of grammar or syntax by itself proves falsity in the sense relevant to determining actual malice under the First Amendment. An interviewer who writes from notes often will engage in the task of attempting a reconstruction of the speaker's statement. That author would, we may assume, act with knowledge that at times she has attributed to her subject words other than those actually used. Under petitioner's proposed standard, an author in this situation would lack First Amendment protection if she reported as quotations the substance of a subject's derogatory statements about himself.
Even if a journalist has tape recorded the spoken statement of a public figure, the full and exact statement will be reported in only rare circumstances. The existence of both a speaker and a reporter; the translation between two media, speech and the printed word; the addition of punctuation; and the practical necessity to edit and make intelligible a speaker's perhaps rambling comments, all make it misleading to suggest that a quotation will be reconstructed with complete accuracy. The use or absence of punctuation may distort a speaker's meaning, for example, where that meaning turns upon a speaker's emphasis of a particular word. In other cases, if a speaker makes an obvious misstatement, for example by unconscious substitution of one name for another, a journalist might alter the speaker's words but preserve his intended meaning. And conversely, an exact quotation out of context can distort meaning, although the speaker did use each reported word.
In all events, technical distinctions between correcting grammar and syntax and some greater level of alteration do not appear workable, for we can think of no method by which courts or juries would draw the line between cleaning up and other changes, except by reference to the meaning a statement conveys to a reasonable reader. To attempt narrow distinctions of this type would be an unnecessary departure from First Amendment principles of general applicability, and, just as important, a departure from the underlying purposes of the tort of libel as understood since the latter half of the 16th century. From then until now, the tort action for defamation has existed to redress injury to the plaintiff's reputation by a statement that is defamatory and false. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, — (1990). As we have recognized, "[t]he legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 341 (1974). If an author alters a speaker's words but effects no material change in meaning, including any meaning conveyed by the manner or fact of expression, the speaker suffers no injury to reputation that is compensable as a defamation.
These essential principles of defamation law accommodate the special case of inaccurate quotations without the necessity for a discrete body of jurisprudence directed to this subject alone. Last Term, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., we refused "to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled `opinion.' " 497 U. S., at — (slip op., at 16) (citation omitted). We recognized that "expressions of `opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact." Ibid. We allowed the defamation action to go forward in that case, holding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the so-called expressions of opinion could be interpreted as including false assertions as to factual matters. So too in the case before us, we reject any special test of falsity for quotations, including one which would draw the line at correction of grammar or syntax. We conclude, rather, that the exceptions suggested by petitioner for grammatical or syntactical corrections serve to illuminate a broader principle.
The common law of libel takes but one approach to the question of falsity, regardless of the form of the communication. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 563, Comment c (1977); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 776 (5th ed. 1984). It overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth. As in other jurisdictions, California law permits the defense of substantial truth, and would absolve a defendant even if she cannot "justify every word of the alleged defamatory matter; it is sufficient if the substance of the charge be proved true, irrespective of slight inaccuracy in the details." B. Witkin, Summary of California Law, 495 (9th ed. 1988) (citing cases). In this case, of course, the burden is upon petitioner to prove falsity. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). The essence of that inquiry, however, remains the same whether the burden rests upon plaintiff or defendant. Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as "the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified." Heuer v. Kee, 15 Cal. App. 2d. 710, 714, 59 P. 2d 1063, 1064 (1936); see also Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 623 F. 2d 616, 619 (CA9 1980); Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 569 F. 2d 459, 465-466 (CA9 1978). Put another way, the statement is not considered false unless it "would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced." R. Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 138 (1980); see, e. g., Wheling v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 721 F. 2d 506, 509 (CA5 1983); see generally R. Smolla, Law of Defamation 5.08 (1991). Our definition of actual malice relies upon this historical understanding.
We conclude that a deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsity for purposes of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 279-280, and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, at 342, unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement. The use of quotations to attribute words not in fact spoken bears in a most important way on that inquiry, but it is not dispositive in every case.
Deliberate or reckless falsification that comprises actual malice turns upon words and punctuation only because words and punctuation express meaning. Meaning is the life of language. And, for the reasons we have given, quotations may be a devastating instrument for conveying false meaning. In the case under consideration, readers of In the Freud Archives may have found Malcolm's portrait of petitioner especially damning because so much of it appeared to be a self-portrait, told by petitioner in his own words. And if the alterations of petitioner's words gave a different meaning to the statements, bearing upon their defamatory character, then the device of quotations might well be critical in finding the words actionable.
D
The Court of Appeals applied a test of substantial truth which, in exposition if not in application, comports with much of the above discussion. The Court of Appeals, however, went one step beyond protection of quotations that convey the meaning of a speaker's statement with substantial accuracy and concluded that an altered quotation is protected so long as it is a "rational interpretation" of an actual statement, drawing this standard from our decisions in Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971), and Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). Application of our protection for rational interpretation in this context finds no support in general principles of defamation law or in our First Amendment jurisprudence. Neither Time, Inc. v. Pape, nor Bose Corp., involved the fabrication of quotations, or any analogous claim, and because many of the quotations at issue might reasonably be construed to state or imply factual assertions that are both false and defamatory, we cannot accept the reasoning of the Court of Appeals on this point.
In Time, Inc. v. Pape, we reversed a libel judgment which arose out of a magazine article summarizing a report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights discussing police civil rights abuses. The article quoted the Commission's summary of the facts surrounding an incident of police brutality, but failed to include the Commission's qualification that these were allegations taken from a civil complaint. The Court noted that "the attitude of the Commission toward the factual verity of the episodes recounted was anything but straightforward," and distinguished between a "direct account of events that speak for themselves," 401 U. S., at 285, 286, and an article descriptive of what the Commission had reported. Time, Inc. v. Pape took into account the difficult choices that confront an author who departs from direct quotation and offers his own interpretation of an ambiguous source. A fair reading of our opinion is that the defendant did not publish a falsification sufficient to sustain a finding of actual malice.
In Bose Corp., a Consumer Reports reviewer had attempted to describe in words the experience of listening to music through a pair of loudspeakers, and we concluded that the result was not an assessment of events that speak for themselves, but " `one of a number of possible rational interpretations' of an event `that bristled with ambiguities' and descriptive challenges for the writer." 466 U. S., at 512 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Pape, supra, at 290). We refused to permit recovery for choice of language which, though perhaps reflecting a misconception, represented "the sort of inaccuracy that is commonplace in the forum of robust debate to which the New York Times rule applies." 466 U. S., at 513.
The protection for rational interpretation serves First Amendment principles by allowing an author the interpretive license that is necessary when relying upon ambiguous sources. Where, however, a writer uses a quotation, and where a reasonable reader would conclude that the quotation purports to be a verbatim repetition of a statement by the speaker, the quotation marks indicate that the author is not involved in an interpretation of the speaker's ambiguous statement, but attempting to convey what the speaker said. This orthodox use of a quotation is the quintessential "direct account of events that speak for themselves." Time, Inc. v. Pape, supra, at 285. More accurately, the quotation allows the subject to speak for himself.
The significance of the quotations at issue, absent any qualification, is to inform us that we are reading the statement of petitioner, not Malcolm's rational interpretation of what petitioner has said or thought. Were we to assess quotations under a rational interpretation standard, we would give journalists the freedom to place statements in their subjects' mouths without fear of liability. By eliminating any method of distinguishing between the statements of the subject and the interpretation of the author, we would diminish to a great degree the trustworthiness of the printed word, and eliminate the real meaning of quotations. Not only public figures but the press doubtless would suffer under such a rule. Newsworthy figures might become more wary of journalists, knowing that any comment could be transmuted and attributed to the subject, so long as some bounds of rational interpretation were not exceeded. We would ill serve the values of the First Amendment if we were to grant near absolute, constitutional protection for such a practice. We doubt the suggestion that as a general rule readers will assume that direct quotations are but a rational interpretation of the speaker's words, and we decline to adopt any such presumption in determining the permissible interpretations of the quotations in question here.
III
A
We apply these principles to the case before us. On summary judgment, we must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the the nonmoving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S., at 255. So we must assume, except where otherwise evidenced by the transcripts of the tape recordings, that petitioner is correct in denying that he made the statements attributed to him by Malcolm, and that Malcolm reported with knowledge or reckless disregard of the differences between what petitioner said and what was quoted.
Respondents argue that, in determining whether petitioner has shown sufficient falsification to survive summary judgment, we should consider not only the tape recorded statements but also Malcolm's typewritten notes. We must decline that suggestion. To begin with, petitioner affirms in an affidavit that he did not make the complained of statements. The record contains substantial additional evidence, moreover, evidence which, in a light most favorable to petitioner, would support a jury determination under a clear and convincing standard that Malcolm deliberately or recklessly altered the quotations.
First, many of the challenged passages resemble quotations that appear on the tapes, except for the addition or alteration of certain phrases, giving rise to a reasonable inference that the statements have been altered. Second, Malcolm had the tapes in her possession and was not working under a tight deadline. Unlike a case involving hot news, Malcolm cannot complain that she lacked the practical ability to compare the tapes with her work in progress. Third, Malcolm represented to the editor-in-chief of The New Yorker that all the quotations were from the tape recordings. Fourth, Malcolm's explanations of the time and place of unrecorded conversations during which petitioner allegedly made some of the quoted statements have not been consistent in all respects. Fifth, petitioner suggests that the progression from typewritten notes, to manuscript, then to galleys provides further evidence of intentional alteration. Malcolm contests petitioner's allegations, and only a trial on the merits will resolve the factual dispute. But at this stage, the evidence creates a jury question whether Malcolm published the statements with knowledge or reckless disregard of the alterations.
B
We must determine whether the published passages differ materially in meaning from the tape recorded statements so as to create an issue of fact for a jury as to falsity.
(a) "Intellectual Gigolo." We agree with the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals that "[f]airly read, intellectual gigolo suggests someone who forsakes intellectual integrity in exchange for pecuniary or other gain." 895 F. 2d, at 1551. A reasonable jury could find a material difference between the meaning of this passage and petitioner's tape-recorded statement that he was considered "much too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for these important training analysts to be caught dead with [him]."
The Court of Appeals majority found it difficult to perceive how the "intellectual gigolo" quotation was defamatory, a determination supported not by any citation to California law, but only by the argument that the passage appears to be a report of Eissler's and Anna Freud's opinions of petitioner. Id., at 1541. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the most natural interpretation of this quotation is not an admission that petitioner considers himself an intellectual gigolo but a statement that Eissler and Anna Freud considered him so. It does not follow, though, that the statement is harmless. Petitioner is entitled to argue that the passage should be analyzed as if Malcolm had reported falsely that Eissler had given this assessment (with the added level of complexity that the quotation purports to represent petitioner's understanding of Eissler's view). An admission that two well-respected senior colleagues considered one an "intellectual gigolo" could be as or more damaging than a similar self-appraisal. In all events, whether the "intellectual gigolo" quotation is defamatory is a question of California law. To the extent that the Court of Appeals based its conclusion in the First Amendment, it was mistaken.
The Court of Appeals relied upon the "incremental harm" doctrine as an alternative basis for its decision. As the court explained it, "[t]his doctrine measures the incremental reputational harm inflicted by the challenged statements beyond the harm imposed by the nonactionable remainder of the publication." Ibid.; see generally Note, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1909 (1985); R. Smolla, Law of Defamation 9.10[4][d] (1991). The court ruled, as a matter of law, that "[g]iven the . . . many provocative, bombastic statements indisputably made by Masson and quoted by Malcolm, the additional harm caused by the `intellectual gigolo' quote was nominal or nonexistent, rendering the defamation claim as to this quote nonactionable." 895 F. 2d, at 1541.
This reasoning requires a court to conclude that, in fact, a plaintiff made the other quoted statements, cf. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 241 U. S. App. D. C. 246, 251, 746 F. 2d 1563, 1568 (1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and then to undertake a factual inquiry into the reputational damage caused by the remainder of the publication. As noted by the dissent in the Court of Appeals, the most "provocative, bombastic statements" quoted by Malcolm are those complained of by petitioner, and so this would not seem an appropriate application of the incremental harm doctrine. 895 F. 2d, at 1566.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals provided no indication whether it considered the incremental harm doctrine to be grounded in California law or the First Amendment. Here, we reject any suggestion that the incremental harm doctrine is compelled as a matter of First Amendment protection for speech. The question of incremental harm does not bear upon whether a defendant has published a statement with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. As a question of state law, on the other hand, we are given no indication that California accepts this doctrine, though it remains free to do so. Of course, state tort law doctrines of injury, causation, and damages calculation might allow a defendant to press the argument that the statements did not result in any incremental harm to a plaintiff's reputation.
(b) "Sex, Women, Fun." This passage presents a closer question. The "sex, women, fun" quotation offers a very different picture of petitioner's plans for Maresfield Gardens than his remark that "Freud's library alone is priceless." See supra, at 5. Petitioner's other tape-recorded remarks did indicate that he and another analyst planned to have great parties at the Freud house and, in a context that may not even refer to Freud house activities, to "pass women on to each other." We cannot conclude as a matter of law that these remarks bear the same substantial meaning as the quoted passage's suggestion that petitioner would make the Freud house a place of "sex, women, fun."
(c) "It Sounded Better." We agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that any difference between petitioner's tape-recorded statement that he "just liked" the name Moussaieff, and the quotation that "it sounded better" is, in context, immaterial. Although Malcolm did not include all of petitioner's lengthy explanation of his name change, she did convey the gist of that explanation: Petitioner took his abandoned family name as his middle name. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the words attributed to petitioner did not materially alter the meaning of his statement.
(d) "I Don't Know Why I Put It In." Malcolm quotes petitioner as saying that he "tacked on at the last minute" a "totally gratuitous" remark about the "sterility of psychoanalysis" in an academic paper, and that he did so for no particular reason. In the tape recordings, petitioner does admit that the remark was "possibly [a] gratuitously offensive way to end a paper to a group of analysts," but when asked why he included the remark, he answered "[because] it was true . . . I really believe it." Malcolm's version contains material differences from petitioner's statement, and it is conceivable that the alteration results in a statement that could injure a scholar's reputation.
(e) "Greatest Analyst Who Ever Lived." While petitioner did, on numerous occasions, predict that his theories would do irreparable damage to the practice of psychoanalysis, and did suggest that no other analyst shared his views, no taperecorded statement appears to contain the substance or the arrogant and unprofessional tone apparent in this quotation. A material difference exists between the quotation and the tape-recorded statements, and a jury could find that the difference exposed petitioner to contempt, ridicule or obloquy.
(f) "He Had The Wrong Man." The quoted version makes it appear as if petitioner rejected a plea to remain in stoic silence and do "the honorable thing." The tape-recorded version indicates that petitioner rejected a plea supported by far more varied motives: Eissler told petitioner that not only would silence be "the honorable thing," but petitioner would "save face," and might be rewarded for that silence with eventual reinstatement. Petitioner described himself as willing to undergo a scandal in order to shine the light of publicity upon the actions of the Freud Archives, while Malcolm would have petitioner describe himself as a person who was "the wrong man" to do "the honorable thing." This difference is material, a jury might find it defamatory, and, for the reasons we have given, there is evidence to support a finding of deliberate or reckless falsification.
C
Because of the Court of Appeals' disposition with respect to Malcolm, it did not have occasion to address petitioner's argument that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. on the basis of their respective relations with Malcolm or the lack of any independent actual malice. These questions are best addressed in the first instance on remand.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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